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A RESPONSE: THE IMPACT OF WAR ON JUSTICE IN THE 
HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW
WILLIAM E. NELSON*
The outstanding papers in this symposium have raised a number of inter-
esting questions about my work and have offered me an unusual opportunity, 
for which I am most grateful, to synthesize what I hope I have accomplished 
over an almost five-decade-long academic career. But I must be clear at the 
outset: I now see a conceptual unity in my work that I did not see when I be-
gan writing or during the course of my writing over the years.
I think that my lack of awareness about where my scholarship would 
lead is at least partly inherent in the nature of the discipline of history. Histori-
ans write about what actually happened in the past. As a result, until they have 
completed researching their archival sources, they can only guess at the story 
they will tell. Moreover, if historians pay attention to their sources, inevitably 
those sources will modify the story they initially imagined. If an historian 
writes, as I have done, on widely different time periods, the inability to con-
ceptualize where his or her scholarship will lead will be exacerbated.
Fifty years ago, I knew that I wanted to be a professor at a university. I 
also knew, upon completing my first student law review note, that I had 
learned and would learn nothing in law school about how to do scholarship. It 
seemed clear that I would need to attend graduate school in a subject I en-
joyed—history—to learn how to be a scholar.
In the first few weeks of graduate school, my mentor, Bernard Bailyn, 
taught me a lesson that has influenced my work ever since—that an easy and 
often fruitful way of doing history is to trace and explain change over time. 
Bailyn also directed me to get downtown to a treasure trove of court records 
that no historian had ever read and to see what I could find in them that was 
interesting.1 I have been doing both ever since in an effort, first and foremost, 
to write quality history.
* Edward Weinfeld Professor of Law and Professor of History, New York University. The author is indebted 
to participants at a panel of the American Society for Legal History, at faculty workshops at New York 
University School of Law and at Valparaiso University Law School, and to members of the Legal History 
Colloquium of New York University for their comments and suggestions, particularly to John Attanasio,
Felice Batlan, Richard Bernstein, and Jeremy Waldron.
1. Specifically, Bailyn told me to go downtown and start reading the court records until I saw some-
thing significant changing and then to explain the change.
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While I have been writing history, I also have been teaching law. Like 
many of my colleagues in law teaching during the years I have been a profes-
sor, I have sensed that the American legal system reached its apogee some-
time in the past (we professors disagree sharply on when that was) and that 
the direction of legal change has been downhill ever since. For me, American 
law reached its highest point during the decade of the 1960s, with the Warren 
Court’s criminal procedure decisions, the expansion of tort liability, the 
movement for consumer protection, and the 1966 amendments to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, among other things. After the 1960s, the value 
structure underlying these developments fragmented, and law began to evolve 
in divergent directions, many of them inconsistent with my views of social 
justice.
I report my sense of the law’s fragmentation and decline because it has, I 
am now convinced, unconsciously affected my scholarship. It has shaped the 
topics about which I have chosen to write as well as the manner in which I 
have written about them. My plan in this essay is to bring to the surface the 
reasons for my choice of topics and my unconscious assumptions about frag-
mentation and decline; surfacing my assumptions and reasons will, I believe, 
assist me in delineating the conceptual unity that I now see in my work.
I. THE HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WAR AND LAW
Let me turn first to the historian’s task of tracing change over time. In 
my first project, the dissertation that eventually became Americanization of 
the Common Law2 and in two books that are spinoffs from it, Dispute and 
Conflict Resolution in Plymouth County, Massachusetts,3 and my little book 
on Marbury v. Madison,4 I made a calculated guess that American law in 
general, and the law of Massachusetts in particular, must have changed dra-
matically between the mid-eighteenth century and 1830, the year in which 
Leonard Levy’s biography of Lemuel Shaw5 began its intensive analysis of 
the Commonwealth’s law. As a student of Bernard Bailyn and Gordon Wood, 
I also hypothesized that the American Revolution and its aftermath must have 
had something to do with the change. As I worked through the sources and 
developed my synthesis, what some might call my obsession with the signifi-
2. WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL 
CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830 (1975).
3. WILLIAM E. NELSON, DISPUTE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN PLYMOUTH COUNTY,
MASSACHUSETTS, 1725-1825 (1981).
4. WILLIAM E. NELSON, MARBURY V. MADISON: THE ORIGINS AND LEGACY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
(2000). An earlier version of the book appeared as William E. Nelson, The Eighteenth-Century Background 
of John Marshall’s Constitutional Jurisprudence, 76 MICH. L. REV. 893 (1978).
5. LEONARD W. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW (1957).
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cance of war as a force underlying legal change began to emerge. Surely, the 
main theme of Americanization—what distinguishes it from Morton J. Hor-
witz’s Transformation of American Law6 and James Willard Hurst’s Law and 
the Conditions of Freedom7—is its implicit claim that the institutional, socie-
tal, and intellectual changes brought on by American independence had as 
much impact on legal change over the next half century as the urge to use law 
to promote prosperity and economic growth. Independence made it clear, for 
example, that Americans no longer needed to use the common law forms of 
action or maintain a religious establishment simply because the English did.
My second big hunch, which is so obvious that I am surprised that more 
legal historians have not written more about it, is that the Civil War led to the 
transformation of American constitutionalism and especially of American 
federalism. This hunch produced two books, The Roots of American Bureau-
cracy8 and The Fourteenth Amendment.9 As Sally Gordon noted many years 
ago when I was presenting The Fourteenth Amendment book to the N.Y.U. 
Legal History Colloquium and as Gautham Rao has ably and eloquently ob-
served in his discussion of Roots in this symposium,10 the theme of the impact 
of war and its aftermath on the law is on the surface of both books, as of much 
of my other historical work.
My third big project was the legal history of twentieth-century New 
York, which resulted in The Legalist Reformation,11 my biography of Judge 
Weinfeld,12 and much of the contents of Fighting for the City.13 My reason 
for turning to the project, so I then thought, grew out of a legal history elective 
I taught to first-year students in the early 1980s. The course ended in 1860—a
stopping point that left the students unhappy. They wanted a course that cov-
ered the twentieth century, but I was unable to produce that course because, as 
6. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977).
7. JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY 
UNITED STATES (1956).
8. WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY, 1830-1900 (1982). The core 
claim of this book is that the Civil War substantially reduced the ability of state governments to limit the 
power of any political majority that controlled both Congress and the presidency; in response, bureaucratic 
structures were created in Congress and the executive branch, and formalism was augmented in the judiciary, 
as an alternative way of limiting majoritarian political power.
9. WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL 
DOCTRINE (1988).
10. Gautham Rao, William E. Nelson’s The Roots of American Bureaucracy and the Resuscita-
tion of the Early American State, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 997 (2014).
11. WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE LEGALIST REFORMATION: LAW, POLITICS, AND IDEOLOGY IN NEW 
YORK, 1920-1980 (2001).
12. WILLIAM E. NELSON, IN PURSUIT OF RIGHT AND JUSTICE: EDWARD WEINFELD AS LAWYER AND 
JUDGE (2004).
13. WILLIAM E. NELSON, FIGHTING FOR THE CITY: A HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK CITY 
CORPORATION COUNSEL (2008).
1112 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 89:3
of the 1980s, no one had written a comprehensive history of twentieth-century 
American law. There was a gap in the scholarly literature, and I embarked on 
my third project to fill that gap. As I examined the sources and strove to iden-
tify for myself the underlying causes of change, the elephant in the room—the 
Second World War—kept coming to the fore. In retrospect, I suspect it was 
that elephant that really had led me to write about the twentieth century.
A common pattern, of which I was unaware but which probably under-
lay all my writing, existed in all three of these eras of legal transformation 
about which I have written. War is the starting point of each. Before all three 
wars—the Revolutionary War, the Civil War, and World War II—Americans 
were sharply divided over the course the nation should take. There were po-
tential Patriots and Loyalists before the Revolution, Unionists and Secession-
ists before the Civil War, and anti-fascists and isolationists before World War 
II. But events on each occasion propelled the nation to war, and by the time 
each war had ended in victory, fundamental change had occurred. Dissent had 
been squelched, and those who were—or were labeled as—potential enemy 
collaborators were driven from their homes, using whatever coercive, often 
unconstitutional means the circumstances appeared to require, ranging from 
the exile of Loyalists, to the imprisonment of Secessionists, and the intern-
ment of Japanese-Americans.
At the same time, war leaders—the names Adams, Jefferson, Lincoln, 
and Franklin Roosevelt immediately come to mind—and others working with 
them articulated ideals of democratic decision making, liberty, and equality 
that nearly all Americans fighting alongside them accepted, at least in theory 
if not in full reality, as the justification for war. The wars themselves resulted 
in significant expenditures of blood and treasure and continually led Ameri-
cans to ask whether war was worth its costs. Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address 
gave the paradigmatic answer to that question in reemphasizing the worth of 
the Civil War’s ideals and in urging rededication to their attainment. As vast 
numbers of Americans did, in fact, dedicate themselves to attaining the ideals 
of each of the three wars, they thereby transmuted wartime ideals into part of 
the American creed.
War also altered the conditions under which America existed in the 
world community. Changed conditions raised new issues for the legal system, 
and the new American creed provided a reference point for resolving them. 
After each of the wars ended, the victors remained in positions of power and 
continued to use their power to incorporate their ideals gradually into domes-
tic law, thereby bringing the reality of life in America closer to, although nev-
er entirely congruent with, the ideals of democracy, liberty, and equality. Over 
time—some four decades in the case of the Revolution, a single decade for 
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the Civil War, and some twenty five years for World War II—the victorious 
coalitions fragmented, efforts to incorporate wartime ideals into domestic law 
tapered off, and the legal system went into decline. I reported on this pattern 
most explicitly in the Legalist Reformation, although it existed in the Revolu-
tionary and Civil War eras as well.
War remains a force stimulating legal change in my current project, The 
Common Law in Colonial America,14 although the patterns of legal develop-
ment are somewhat different. In volume two I argued that the English Civil 
War and the ultimate compromise restoring Charles II to a penurious throne 
led to a decision by the crown to govern and control its American colonies by 
using law and lawyers rather than a bureaucracy that it could not afford15—a
decision that led to a remarkable growth of the legal profession in colonial 
America, gave lawyers a preeminence in America that they lacked even in 
England, and left the United States today as the most overly lawyered society 
in the world.
In volume three, by contrast, I anticipate arguing that the 1688 ascension 
of William III to the throne, which committed England to seventy-five years 
of war with France and Spain in defense of Protestantism and northern Euro-
pean political autonomy, functioned in England and its colonies much as the 
American Revolution, the American Civil War, and World War II functioned 
later in the United States. It led to the consolidation of power around William 
and Mary, Queen Anne, and later Hanoverian monarchs and coercively re-
duced their Jacobite rivals to political irrelevance. It also led to the articulation 
of why it mattered to be English and Protestant rather than French or Spanish 
and Roman Catholic: the English, as they saw it, enjoyed liberty and self-
government, whereas the French and Spanish lived under arbitrary, hierar-
chical government. As this ideology of English freedom spread to England’s 
colonies, the ideology put an effective end to the crown’s efforts under 
Charles and James to control the colonies from above and allowed American 
law to develop in a decentralized fashion grounded on the power of local 
juries and an independent, local judiciary.
Finally, volume four will show how Britain’s victory in the Seven Years 
War led English authorities to think that they could solve problems arising 
from war by taxing and legislating for America, without appreciating that 
Americans would fight to preserve the decentralized legal system they had 
developed and that their fight would impede the enforcement of Parliamentary 
14. WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE COMMON LAW IN COLONIAL AMERICA: VOLUME I: THE CHESAPEAKE 
AND NEW ENGLAND, 1607-1660 (2008).
15. WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE COMMON LAW IN COLONIAL AMERICA: VOLUME II: THE MIDDLE 
COLONIES AND THE CAROLINAS, 1660-1730, at 2-6 (2013).
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legislation, paralyze central government, and ultimately force Britain to turn 
to war. American legal and political institutions remain strikingly decentral-
ized to this day—a decentralization that continues to affect the nation’s poli-
tics profoundly.16
I have a strong personal stake in my understanding that war and its af-
termath are powerful forces underlying legal change. Although I was not fully 
aware of the stake until I wrote The Legalist Reformation, that stake, I sus-
pect, led me to conceptualize the project in the fashion that I did. I was born in 
1940, as the child of an ethnic mother, and grew up in the aftermath of Amer-
ica’s World War II rejection of Nazism and acceptance of ideals of liberty and 
ethnic equality. The nation’s rejection of Nazism and commitment to liberty 
and equality may be the most important intellectual facts of my life. I remem-
ber how I spent the summer of 1952, as a twelve-year old adolescent, reading 
Winston Churchill’s six-volume history of World War II. Churchill’s six vol-
umes taught me more than sixty years ago what was at stake in World War II 
and how that war had transformed the world: they taught me that the war had 
been fought to make me and others like me full-fledged, equal members of 
society, while changes spawned by the war that had occurred at least in New 
York City’s suburbs had, in fact, produced that result. Somehow, I have al-
ways understood that my freedom to strive for a better life than the one that 
had been available to my ethnic mother was a legacy from those who had 
fought to obliterate racist Nazi beliefs.
My understanding of America’s World War II acceptance of ethnic 
equality and rejection of Nazi racism has always determined my own politics. 
I always have understood that I would be guilty of hypocrisy if I argued that I 
should be treated equally but failed to support claims for equal treatment on 
behalf of others. Deep down I feared that, if racists succeeded in denying 
equality to those whom I might perceive as beneath me, those same racists 
sooner or later would strive to deny equality to me. I appreciated, that is, the 
precarious nature of my equality. I knew that, if I was to enjoy equal liberty in 
America, every other American had to enjoy the same equal liberty with me. 
The alternative would be government by a privileged few, and I always 
grasped that I would not be one of the privileged.
16. I appreciate the suggestion of Laurie Benton and Kathryn Walker that my work on colonial British 
American law could be broadened to include analysis of legal development in the Dutch, French, Portu-
guese, and Spanish empires as well. Lauren Benton & Kathryn Walker, Law of the Empire: The Common 
Law in Colonial America and the Problem of Legal Diversity, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 973 (2014). I am 
pleased to see it considered in that broader perspective. Unfortunately, I doubt that I will have the longevity 
and know that I lack the skills to do any of the broader analysis myself.
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II. JUDICIAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE WARTIME IDEOLOGY
For at least forty of the last fifty years, since the time I first wrote an arti-
cle about how Judge Edward Weinfeld decided cases,17 my commitment to 
America’s wartime ideals of liberty and equality has led me to advocate judi-
cial enforcement of the liberty and equality principles. A key foundation of 
my analysis has been to distinguish law, which elaborates those principles, 
from politics, which gives coercive force to the will of transient interest 
groups.18 Thus, I argued in my early article about Weinfeld that he consistent-
ly reached liberal results by applying traditional principles of law to carefully 
sculpted facts.19 In subsequent work, I wrote that Chief Justice John Marshall 
similarly decided cases on the basis of existing law and avoided excursions 
into politics20 and that judges, as a general matter, should decide cases on the 
basis of historically validated, neutral legal principles.21 Likewise, in my book 
on The Fourteenth Amendment, which is subtitled From Political Principle to 
Judicial Doctrine, I discussed the amendment’s drafting and ratification in a 
fashion that “tied . . . history” to politics, but followed up that political analy-
sis with “a lawyerly . . . analysis of the Court’s decisions . . . disconnected 
from politics and history” that sought “to explain the Court on its own 
terms.”22 Most recently, I have urged that it is important “to put an end to 
17. See William E. Nelson, Judge Weinfeld and the Adjudicatory Process: A Law Finder in an Age of 
Judicial Lawmakers, 50 N.Y.U.L. REV. 980 (1975).
18. See id.
19. See NELSON, IN PURSUIT OF RIGHT AND JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 4-5, 224-225.
20. See NELSON, MARBURY V. MADISON, supra note 4, at 59-71.
21. See William E. Nelson, History and Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV.
1237 (1986).
22. Paul Finkelman, Original Intent and the Fourteenth Amendment: Into the Black Hole of 
Constitutional Law, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1019, 1031 (2014). For two reasons, I totally reject Finkel-
man’s suggestion that I should have considered the Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873), and subse-
quent Supreme Court decisions from a more political perspective. The first reason is that, despite 
Finkelman’s lengthy argument, I remain convinced that the justices were striving to put politics aside and 
decide the cases on legal grounds. Like Finkelman, I do not from my presentist perspective agree with many 
of the results the Court reached, but my disagreement does not facilitate conscientious historical analysis of 
the Court’s work product nor did it lead me to speculate, as it did Finkelman, about possible political motiva-
tions on the part of the justices. I continue to take at face value Justice Joseph Bradley’s statement that in 
deciding cases he and the Court were “rather in the condition of seeking for truth, than of dogmatically 
laying down opinions” about the Fourteenth Amendment’s meaning. Joseph P. Bradley to Frederick T. 
Frelinghuysen, July 19, 1874, in Joseph P. Bradley Papers, New Jersey Historical Society, Newark, N.J.  
The second reason is that my understanding of what it means to judge rests on faith that law can 
be distinguished from politics. I understand that Congress and the state legislatures had a policymaking 
role in framing and ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment but that the Supreme Court had a nonoriginal-
ist legal role in subsequently interpreting it. The whole point of the book is to examine how the justices 
as lawyers dealt with the ambiguities that politics and policymaking had implanted in the amendment. 
The book offers no judgment whether they dealt with the ambiguities badly or well, but the book would 
be a pointless exercise if I believed the justices were simply another set of politicians revising what 
earlier politicians in Congress and the state legislatures had done.
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political polarization on the Supreme Court and . . . return the Court to the 
task of enforcing a rule of generally accepted law. . . .”23
I articulated my position most clearly in a 2004 article written to com-
memorate the fiftieth anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education24—for me, 
the grandest moment in the history of American law. The article recognized 
that “legal realists have dominated the jurisprudential landscape of America 
since the 1930s.”25 Like nearly everyone else writing legal history today, I 
share a realist understanding that law is a product of the political, economic, 
and societal context in which the judges and lawyers who administer the law 
do their work. Law is not in its nature intrinsically autonomous and independ-
ent of its context: judges cannot derive results deductively from neutral, ob-
jective, and unchanging sources of law, but must have recourse to emerging 
societal values in determining the law’s meaning. The “common law,” as I 
have noted, always has grown and changed and must continue to grow and 
change “to meet the demands of society.”26
But I also understand that the legal profession and the polity can for po-
litical reasons properly decide that they want their legal system to be as inde-
pendent of and autonomous from politics as possible and can strive to make it 
more rather than less so. Indeed, The Roots of American Bureaucracy argued 
that the profession for good reasons made precisely that decision in the after-
math of the Civil War,27 and my various writings about Chief Justice Mar-
shall28 and Judge Weinfeld29 elaborate how judges can choose to function 
independently of politics. I am convinced that this idea that a polity can de-
cide for realist reasons that it wants its judicial system to be to a significant 
degree formalist—by which I mean that a polity can reject judicial decision 
making based on judges choosing between politically disputed policy per-
spectives and can seek instead to have judges envision themselves as resolv-
ing discrete cases by applying preexisting law to facts—is an important 
insight that should command significant attention, even though almost every-
one today in the legal academy, on the bench, and in politics is ignoring it.
23. William E. Nelson et al., The Liberal Tradition of the Supreme Court Clerkship: Its Rise, Fall, and 
Reincarnation? 62 VAND. L. REV. 1749, 1806 (2009).
24. William E. Nelson, Brown v. Board of Education and the Jurisprudence of Legal Realism, 48 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 795 (2004).
25. Id. at 798.
26. Id. at 805.
27. See NELSON, ROOTS OF AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY, supra note 8, at 82-112, 133-148.
28. See NELSON, MARBURY V. MADISON, supra note 4, at 54-71.
29. See NELSON, IN PURSUIT OF RIGHT AND JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 133-156; Nelson, Judge
Weinfeld and the Adjudicatory Process, supra note 17.
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Accordingly, I argued in my article on Brown30 that realism is not a sin-
gle, unitary phenomenon, but at least two separate, distinctive ones—the one 
highly political, and the other apolitical. Realist judges can extract law not 
only from their personal policy preferences but from the unfolding of social 
change as well. In the Brown article, I drew a
sharp, analytical distinction. One the one hand, a judge might see herself 
as an agent of society who is under a duty to make law conform to the 
wishes of society. If such a judge thinks of society as a train, the law will 
appear as the caboose at the end of the train, and the judge’s job will be 
to keep the caboose on the same track as the train. On the other hand, a 
judge might see himself as society’s commander. Looking upon society 
as a train, law will emerge as the engine, and the judge as the engineer 
who must determine the direction that the train ultimately will take.31
I made clear my agreement with the view that judges should sit in the 
caboose to make sure the caboose remains on the same track as the train. In 
contrast, by quoting among other things the wisdom of Justice Felix Frankfur-
ter that a judge is “not justified in writing [his] private notions of policy into 
the Constitution, no matter how deeply [he] may cherish them or how mis-
chievous [he] may deem their disregard,”32 I expressed doubts about judges 
assuming the role of societal commander.
There are four objections to judges assuming a commanding role. First, it 
has been argued that judges who turn to personal policy preferences in decid-
ing cases violate principles of separation of powers that leave issues of policy 
to the more democratic branches of government.33 Second, judges who adopt 
particular policy positions abandon their role as impartial, neutral arbiters of 
disputes who enter upon the decision of cases without prejudging them; the 
judges tend to become policy advocates instead.34 Third, although some judg-
es who decide cases based on their personal policy views will reach progres-
sive results that liberals will like, other judges will be reactionaries striving to 
impose eighteenth- or nineteenth-century values on the nation.35 Fourth, citi-
zens who already agree with particular results will applaud opinions that an-
nounce them, but those who have different views will find opinions 
unpersuasive. Insofar as persuasiveness constitutes the foundation of judicial 
30. See Nelson, The Jurisprudence of Legal Realism, supra note 24, at 799.
31. Id.
32. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 647 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), quoted in,
Nelson, The Jurisprudence of Legal Realism, supra note 24, at 805.
33. See Nelson, The Jurisprudence of Legal Realism, supra note 24, at 825-26.
34. Federal judges, for example, take an oath to “administer justice without respect to persons, and do 
equal right to the poor and to the rich.” 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2012).
35. See Nelson, The Jurisprudence of Legal Realism, supra note 24, at 832, 835-36, 838. See also 
William E. Nelson, Second Response, Review Essays: An Exchange on Critical Legal Studies between 
Robert W. Gordon and William Nelson, 6 L. & HIST. REV. 139, 185 (1988).
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power, the judiciary will be weakened by what some observers will find un-
persuasive about some of its opinions.36
Not everyone, of course, will find all or any of these four concerns meri-
torious. In particular, I think that religious advocates who want to turn the 
nation into a theocracy like eighteenth-century Massachusetts, theorists who 
care more about economic efficiency and profit making than equality and 
democratic lawmaking, and utopians who imagine that, if empowered, they 
actually could create a compassionate welfare state, might reject all four.
Those who have lost all faith in the capacity of the political process to govern 
also might want to transform judges into authoritative political actors rather 
than mere arbiters of disputes.
But for anyone who pays heed to some or all of the objections to judicial 
activism mentioned above, my historical work will point toward the conclu-
sion that judges are obligated to enforce principles of democracy, liberty, and 
equality. As I now look back over my writing about the role of judges in con-
junction with my historical writing, I see connections that clarify my argu-
ment about how judges should perform their job of deciding cases.
The foundation of my argument, as already noted, is that judges should 
not assume the role of directing the course of social change. They should not, 
that is, strive to enact their policy preferences into law. The only policies that 
judges can properly translate into law are ones that society as an entity has 
already overwhelmingly adopted or is in the process of adopting. By what 
means, however, can judges derive law from what society has already done or 
is engaged in doing? Not from doctrines that have come down to them from 
some distantly shrouded past. Nor, as I argued in my book on The Fourteenth 
Amendment, can judges find law in the intentions of democratic lawmakers 
who either failed to grasp future issues or papered over their differences by 
delegating to future judges authority to decide the hard questions about which 
the lawmakers could not agree.37 How can judges know what society wants 
when that knowledge is not contained in past precedents or in the products of 
democratic lawmaking?
Here I need to return to my article on Brown v. Board of Education,38
where I discussed at some length two important books that are very much in 
point to my analysis—Benjamin Cardozo’s The Nature of the Judicial Pro-
cess39 and Ronald Dworkin’s Law’s Empire.40
36. See Nelson et al., The Liberal Tradition of the Supreme Court Clerkship, supra note 23, at 1804.
37. See NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, supra note 9, at 148-151.
38. Nelson, The Jurisprudence of Legal Realism, supra note 24.
39. BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
40. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986).
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Cardozo viewed law as a caboose. In his view, the duty of judges was to 
keep law consistent with
“the mores of the community,” with its “ethics or . . . social sense of jus-
tice, whether formulated in creed or system, or immanent in the common 
mind.” Cardozo was clear that the “standard” for judges . . . ” must be an 
objective one.” Judges were not “free to substitute their own ideas of 
reason and justice for those of the men and women whom they serve.” 
They were not “commissioned to set aside existing rules at pleasure in 
favor of any other set of rules which they may hold to be expedient or 
wise.” When judges were “called upon to say how far existing rules 
[were] to be extended or restricted,” their duty was to “let the welfare of 
society fix the path, its direction and its distance.”41
Of course, Cardozo recognized that no guarantee existed that judges 
would “interpret the mores of their day more wisely and truly than other men” 
or otherwise get the direction of social change objectively correct.42
Dworkin agreed with Cardozo “that a judge’s task is to interpret socie-
ty’s values, not to impose her own.” But he recognized “that society’s values 
sometimes will be ambivalent. When they are, the judge must point them in 
one direction rather than another in order to make them ‘the best they can be’” 
by taking “recourse to ‘political morality.’”43
For Dworkin, law is thus an engine directing the course of social change. 
Because the duty of the train’s engineer is to drive the train in accordance 
with political morality, which, according to Dworkin, “is objectively true and 
thus transcends the mere policy preferences of judges,”44 Dworkin hopes to 
avoid Cardozo’s concession that the direction of change in society’s values at 
times is unclear.
As I argued in the Brown article, however, “Dworkin’s claim of objec-
tivity is difficult to maintain . . . in a constitutional culture that venerates polit-
ical and religious equality and pluralism.”45 Jeremy Waldron has explained 
the difficulty as well as anyone. Waldron writes:
A confident theorist of justice [might] announce, . . . “[o]f course, there 
is disagreement about justice, but . . . the existence of disagreement is 
quite compatible with one of the contestant views being true and the oth-
ers false.” He can say that, but it is hardly sufficient, particularly if it is 
just a prelude to his saying, “And of course the true view of justice is my
view. . . .” For if he is at all self-aware, he knows very well that he will 
be followed, one by one, by his ideological rivals, each making a similar 
announcement in similarly self-assured tones. . . . [E]ven among those 
41. Nelson, The Jurisprudence of Legal Realism, supra note 24, at 801.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 802.
44. Id.
45. Id.
1120 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 89:3
who accept the proposition that some views about justice are true and 
others false, disagreement will persist as to which is which.46
Both Cardozo and Dworkin thus agree that judges must have recourse in 
their decision-making process to something outside formal legal doctrine—
something they label societal mores or political morality. Both recognize that 
such recourse must occur pursuant to objective standards, but both Cardozo 
and Dworkin’s most salient critic find it difficult indeed, given the depth with 
which Americans typically disagree about the directions that legal change 
should take, to elaborate what those objective standards might be. Both also 
must be aware of the substantial overlap that exists between searching for 
society’s values and striving to determine true transcendent morality.
Important differences exist, however, between Cardozo’s approach of 
searching for society’s vision of political morality and Dworkin’s approach of 
elaborating the true transcendent nature of that morality. The means of 
demonstrating transcendent truth are quite different from the evidence one 
might offer of what a particular society at a specific point in time believed 
truth to be. And here is where history can help.
At most times in American history, diverse, often antagonistic groups 
have struggled against each other to gain control of the political process and to 
impose their moral vision on the nation. In the presence of conflict of this sort, 
Dworkin would but Cardozo would not permit judges to incorporate contested 
values they happen to favor into the law. Of course, judges should give effect 
to political judgments codified in statutes. Otherwise, in Cardozo’s view and 
in mine, they should apply preexisting law whenever they can and avoid de-
ciding novel issues if possible. If doctrinal ambiguity forces them to confront 
the law’s conflicting, underlying values, judges should resolve the ambiguity 
in as minimalist a fashion as possible.
As I have pointed out in my writings about them, both Justice Byron 
White and Judge Edward Weinfeld routinely decided cases in this minimalist 
way. Weinfeld, for one, did not, in cases where competing policies or princi-
ples were at stake, rest his decision on the choice of one or another. Instead, 
he turned to fundamental, true and tried principles acceptable to all and then 
found facts that enabled him to fit the case within these principles in a just 
fashion. Of course, his fact-finding resulted at times in the elaboration and 
tweaking of these principles, but only gradually and minimally.47 White like-
wise was a gradualist and minimalist. In Griswold v. Connecticut,48 for exam-
ple, White did not join the opinions either of Justice William O. Douglas or of 
46. JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 3 (1999).
47. See NELSON, IN PURSUIT OF RIGHT AND JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 139-155.
48. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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Justice Arthur Goldberg, which attempted to create a constitutional right to 
contraception by proclaiming some amorphous right of privacy. For Douglas, 
the right of privacy emerged out of constitutional penumbras, whereas for 
Goldberg, it arose out of the Ninth Amendment. Nor was White prepared to 
join the balanced, thoughtful opinion of Justice John Marshall Harlan, who, 
after examining “the teachings of history” and “the basic values that underlie 
our society,” concluded that the Connecticut statute “violate[d] . . . values 
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s due process clause.49 White wanted an even narrower holding. 
He therefore found Connecticut’s statute void because the only justification 
the state offered for it—that it advanced a policy against promiscuous or illicit 
sexual relations—was not in fact furthered by prohibiting married people 
from using contraceptives. This holding merely decided the case at hand and 
had little transportability into other right of privacy cases that might arise in 
the future.50
At this point, I may sound like a legal process theorist, committed to pas-
sive virtues and the practice of judicial restraint. But, as Brad Snyder recog-
nizes, that misinterprets my views.51 I also believe, as Mark McGarvie has 
noted, that judges should incorporate the “recognized shared beliefs” of the 
“political culture of the American people” into constitutional law52 and should 
protect constitutional rights, especially, as Ed Purcell has observed, the rights 
to liberty, equality, and minority rights emerging out of World War II.53 And, 
like Bruce Ackerman, I understand that constitutional rights can be found not 
only in the text of the 1787 constitution and subsequent amendments, but in 
less formal sources as well.54
49. Id. at 502 (Harlan, J., concurring).
50. Id. at 485-86.
51. Brad Snyder, Rejecting the Legal Process Theory Joker: Bill Nelson’s Scholarship on Judge 
Edward Weinfeld and Justice Byron White, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1065, 1084 (2014).
52. Mark McGarvie, That Elusive Consensus: The Historiographic Significance of William E. 
Nelson’s Works on Judicial Review, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 957, 960 (2014).
53. Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Semi-Wonderful Town, Semi-Wonderful State: Bill Nelson’s New 
York, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1085, 1089 (2014).
54. See generally 1 BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); 2 BRUCE A.
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998); 3 BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE
CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2014). Ackerman and I were colleagues first at the University of Pennsylvania 
Law School and then at Yale Law School during most of the 1970s, and he probably influenced my thinking 
more than I appreciated at the time. As I look back, I can see that, when I became an assistant professor in 
1971, I was concerned with what I perceived as a decline in the quality of judicial decision making; I wanted 
somehow to bind judges to the better law of the past. I believe that Ackerman had similar concerns that led 
him to look to time periods in the past—the framing and ratification of the 1787 constitution, the adoption of 
the Reconstruction amendments, and the New Deal—quite close to the ones I would later examine. But, 
although we may have had somewhat similar motivations, three important differences have distinguished our 
work.
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Indeed, the recognition that activist judges can create constitutional 
rights out of informal sources is more important to understanding my views of 
judging than my acceptance of judicial passivity and restraint in times of po-
litical division. During the three special periods associated with the three great 
wars about which I have written the bulk of my historical scholarship—the 
Revolution, the Civil War, and World War II—judges did incorporate and 
properly should have incorporated new rights into the American constitutional 
edifice. As I believe my writing has shown, those wars created the material 
conditions and moral ideals under which the United States exists today—
ideals that are embedded in the material conditions from which they arose,
cannot readily be separated from them, and together with them constitute a 
seamless whole. Judges, in my view, rightly incorporated the ideals of the 
three wars into the law and thereby transformed the ideals into part of Ameri-
ca’s constitution.
The Revolution, for example, created our political independence against 
a background ideal that all people are created equal with liberty to pursue 
happiness. The Civil War and Reconstruction, in turn, created a unified nation 
out of merely confederated states—a nation ruled by the majority, but one in 
which majorities are required to accept divergent minorities no matter how 
strongly they dislike them or disagree with their views. World War II then 
gave the United States global hegemony based on ideals that all nations 
should enjoy political independence, that majorities should govern through 
democratic processes but at the same time accept minorities, and that all citi-
zens of a nation should possess equal liberty to pursue happiness without 
regard to ethnicity, religion, or race.
I do not claim that it was easy during any of these three eras of trans-
formative change to know with certainty the precise direction that American 
society was taking at any exact point in time. But it was easier than finding 
ultimate, transcendent truths. The eras of the American Revolution, the Civil 
First, Ackerman knew what he was doing—he planned out his argument before he began to write. 
I knew what sources I would examine, but I did not anticipate where they would lead. I simply followed 
them, and only now in retrospect can I begin to elaborate the ideas to which they pointed. Second, a 
major element in Ackerman’s project has been to show that key political events during the New Deal 
were equivalent to formal steps required by the constitutional adoption and amendment processes. My 
work, in contrast, has never addressed these formalisms. I have written instead, to use the language of 
Justice Cardozo, about “the mores of the community,” with its “ethics or . . . social sense of justice, 
whether formulated in creed or system, or immanent in the common mind.” CARDOZO, supra note 39,
at 72. Third, unlike Ackerman, I do not see the New Deal as a time of generally accepted social change, 
but rather as a time of continuing political contestation. As I wrote in The Legalist Reformation, I see 
1938 as the year in which New Yorkers, at least, shifted their attention from highly divisive domestic 
issues to international issues. But, it was only after Pearl Harbor that consensus in support of war 
emerged and ultimately led to the consensus that dominated American law and politics through the 
Eisenhower presidency and into the 1960s.
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War, and World War II were times of crisis and reformation. Transcendent 
truth would emerge from each of these eras of war unchanged, as it always 
must, but the ideals of American society would emerge in a new form. And, if 
a judge had faith about who would win the war and made some good guesses 
about how peace would be sculpted, she could predict the ideals that would 
emerge from the era of war and that she thus should incorporate into the law. 
Above all, she could plausibly believe that in doing so she was following the 
train of social change in the caboose rather than determining the direction of 
change in the engine.
Moreover, whatever uncertainty may have existed during the course of 
the three transformative eras, historical hindsight leaves no doubt that judges 
who incorporated the democratic, libertarian, and egalitarian ideals of the 
Revolution, the Civil War, and World War II into the law were not directing 
the course of change but merely following it. Two examples will illustrate. 
The first is Justice Harlan Fiske Stone’s famous footnote 4 in United States v. 
Carolene Products Co.55 As I wrote in The Legalist Reformation, Stone was 
not making a policy judgment when he crafted footnote 4 but merely restating 
what political leaders were declaring—he was offering an obvious comment 
on the world that he was observing.56 Although Stone commanded only a 
tenuous 4-3 majority in 1938 in support of his opinion and footnote, historical 
hindsight proved him correct.
Brown v. Board of Education57 is the second example. It shows how the 
Court acted as a catalyst for the egalitarian ideology of World War II and the 
postwar era. My historical scholarship in The Legalist Reformation and else-
where,58 together with the work of others,59 establishes that America’s leaders 
and the American people had rejected racism and accepted an ideology of 
ethnic and racial equality as a basis for the fight against Hitler and the need to 
counter Communist propaganda about Southern racial segregation.60 While 
55. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
56. See NELSON, THE LEGALIST REFORMATION, supra note 11, at 123-124. I have the same view of a 
statement by Senator Robert F. Wagner that, while “the essential governmental problem” of “the 18th and 
19th centuries . . . was how to establish the will of the majority in representative government,” in “the world 
of today, the problem is how to protect the integrity and civil liberties of minority groups.” Quoted in id. at
129; see also NELSON, MARBURY V. MADISON, supra note 4, at 108-112 (suggesting that the worldwide 
spread of judicial review in recent decades may be a result of concerns about protecting minority rights); see
generally id. at 119-147. 
57. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
58. See NELSON, THE LEGALIST REFORMATION, supra note 11, at 119-183; Nelson, The Jurispru-
dence of Legal Realism, supra note 24, at 808-15.
59. See ROBERT J. COTTROL, RAYMOND T. DIAMOND, & LELAND B. WARE, BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION: CASTE, CULTURE, AND THE CONSTITUTION (2003); MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL 
RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2000).
60. See Nelson, The Jurisprudence of Legal Realism, supra note 24, at 811-815.
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countertrends, most notably the internment of Japanese-Americans and the 
persistence of Southern segregation, occurred during and after the war, the 
crushing defeat of Hitler made the Nazi idea that some races are intrinsically 
inferior to others—the idea at the root of Southern segregation—unacceptable 
in respectable circles. The Court simply could not have upheld segregation in 
Brown based on that Nazi idea. On the contrary, the Court justified its invali-
dation of segregation based on widely shared American values generated by 
World War II and the new position of the United States in the world order as 
the bulwark of freedom. While doubts persisted through the 1950s about the 
legitimacy of the Court’s reasoning,61 those doubts have been erased by his-
torical hindsight, which proved the ending of state-sanctioned segregation 
correct.
Let me then summarize my main points. (1) Judges must at times have 
recourse to values outside formal doctrinal materials to determine the law’s 
substance and meaning. (2) Judges should not turn to their own personal val-
ues but to objective societal standards. (3) When society is divided over its 
values, judges should not incorporate the values they favor into the law. (4) 
There have been three unique eras in American history—the eras of the Revo-
lution, the Civil War, and World War II—when Americans have united at the 
level of ideals behind a value structure of liberty, equality, democratic majori-
tarianism, and protection of minority rights. Judges have properly followed 
the direction taken by the American people during those three eras and made 
the people’s highest ideals the foundation of American constitutionalism.
In conclusion, my position is that libertarian and egalitarian ideals, pro-
claimed during and in the aftermath of the Revolutionary War, the Civil War, 
and World War II, enjoy special standing in American jurisprudence. Docu-
ments such as the Declaration of Independence, constitutional provisions such 
as the Fourteenth Amendment, and cases such as Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion proclaim the values for which America stands—values to which judges 
have a special obligation to adhere zealously.
Of course, judges also have a duty to keep the law attuned to changing 
social realities of a more meager sort. But in so doing, they must proceed 
carefully. They need to listen to what they hear from all elements of the politi-
cal spectrum; they need to proceed in a slow and minimalist fashion; and they 
need the humility to recognize that only future historical hindsight will reveal 
for sure whether they actually captured the direction of social change. They 
also need to understand that the political ideals that get incorporated into legal 
doctrine are tightly interconnected with the material conditions out of which 
61. See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1 (1959).
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the ideals arose—the ideals and material conditions are part of the same seam-
less whole, and it is impossible to reject bits and pieces of the whole without 
undermining it in its entirety.
Thus judges, in my view, ought not reject, for example, World War II 
ideals of democracy, liberty, and equality for which the world honors America 
and which therefore provide whatever legitimacy may exist for American 
global hegemony. The package of democracy, liberty, equality, and hegemo-
ny cannot be disaggregated into separate parts, and only the American people 
through the political process have a right to reject the package in its entirety. 
Similarly, majority rule together with acceptance of dissent and local autono-
my are part of the fabric of American law and constitutionalism; judges can-
not reject individual threads in the fabric that they happen to dislike without 
undermining the integrity of the fabric as a whole—a fabric owned again by 
the American people, not by five or even nine Supreme Court justices.
In short, while I understand that we, the people of today, collectively can 
make the law whatever we want it to be, I also understand that a majority of 
justices on a divided court should not change bits and pieces of the law into 
what they want. Judges can, of course, make law by relying on evolving so-
cial practices that do not generate controversy. Likewise, America’s wartime 
ideals of democracy, liberty, and equality are a legitimate source of law, or at 
the very least were a legitimate source in the immediate aftermath of the wars 
in which the American people with near unanimity proclaimed their validity. 
But judges should not impose alternative values that dissenting colleagues 
reject and that divide the American people.
III. THE IMPACT OF SOURCES ON MY SCHOLARSHIP
There are several other characteristics of my work that I also want to 
mention that result, I think, from the types of sources I use and from the ways 
in which I use them.
If an historian is interested in the role law plays in economic develop-
ment or on whether lower economic classes as well as upper classes can use 
law to alter the distribution of wealth, he or she will focus on contract, proper-
ty, tort, and business law. Like Hurst and Horwitz, he or she will write a gen-
eral history of law focused on those doctrinal subjects.62 Like Hurst and 
Horwitz, I devoted a good deal of attention to those subjects in Americaniza-
tion and The Legalist Reformation. But I learned when I wrote Americaniza-
tion to focus on other subjects as well.
62. See HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 6; HURST, LAW AND THE 
CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM, supra note 7.
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It was not that I was smarter than my predecessors or that I ever gave 
any thought to the subjects on which I should focus. Rather the nature of my 
sources compelled me to examine cases about issues beyond those related to 
the economy. The manuscript case records on which I mainly relied in writing 
Americanization were not indexed by subject matter, and so I had to read all 
of them to find important and unusual cases. What I discovered when I read 
all the cases is that litigators care far more about procedure than about any 
single body of substantive law. Accordingly, as David Konig has so ably and 
eloquently observed,63 procedure, especially rules about the power of juries to 
find law as well as fact, became the foundational subject of the book—the 
skeleton to which everything else was tied. Procedure similarly is an im-
portant topic in The Legalist Reformation. Another matter to which my 
sources taught me to pay great attention was religion, perhaps because the 
sources also paid attention to it. A third was the regulation of sexuality and 
family life.
The sources did not, of course, pique my interest in the constitutional is-
sues and issues of government structure that are the focus of The Roots of 
American Bureaucracy and The Fourteenth Amendment. That interest arose 
out of my clerkship with Justice White and especially from my work on the 
opinion that he and Justices William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall filed in 
Oregon v. Mitchell.64 I have always wanted to thank Justice White publicly 
for his assigning me to that case, which first led me to study the history of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, but he took the view that it was improper for me to 
reveal that I had worked on it. I always thought he was wrong, and so I thank 
him now when my work on the case is documented in publicly available ar-
chives and the Justice can no longer object.
The nature of my sources also affected my work in several other re-
spects. The primary sources on which I relied in writing Americanization—
manuscript court records—compelled me to turn to a method of analyzing 
cases that I had learned in law school. Manuscript records of colonial and 
early nineteenth-century cases almost never reveal the judicial reasoning be-
hind decisions; at best, they reveal the facts of a case and the result that the 
decision maker reached. Some legal realists in the 1930s had argued that the 
facts and the result were all that mattered—that the holding of a case consist-
ed only of the result that a judge reached on the facts and that everything said 
in an opinion was dictum.65 I had been taught this realist approach as a first-
63. David T. Konig, Americanization of the Common Law: The Intellectual Migration Meets the 
Great Migration, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 917, 930-33 (2014).
64. 400 U.S. 112, 229 (1970) (Brennan, J., White, J., and Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
65. CARL N. LLEWLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 43-45 (2006).
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year law student, and it enabled me several years later to make full use of 
manuscript records in writing Americanization. I used the approach again in 
summarizing the cases of which I took note in The Legalist Reformation, and 
I doubt whether I could have mastered the vast quantity of cases cited in that 
book if I had paid close attention to everything that the judges wrote rather 
than simply to facts and results.
My scholarship also reflects the legacy of legal realism in a final respect. 
Several years ago the author of a reader’s report on volume one of The Com-
mon Law in Colonial America complained that I had not paid sufficient atten-
tion to colonial legislation—a matter that he found of greater importance to 
colonial legal development than do I. On the understanding that I had to ac-
commodate the reader’s concern to maintain the Oxford Press’s willingness to 
publish the book, I added some references to statutes. But my legal realist 
convictions still tell me that the reader fundamentally was wrong: that if histo-
rians want to know what the law was, they cannot rely on statutes, but must 
read cases that determine what statutes mean, how statutes have been applied, 
and even whether they were applied at all. While there are occasional statutes 
that direct administrators to act in contexts where they are not subject to judi-
cial review, most legislation, as the legal realists well understood,66 receives 
its ultimate meaning only when interpreted by a court. The corpus of my 
work, which relies overwhelmingly on case law and deemphasizes the enact-
ment and citation of legislation, has long reflected this legal realist under-
standing.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the end, what most distinguishes my scholarship from that of other le-
gal historians is my concern with the power of the ideals that have emerged 
from the nation’s three great wars—the Revolution, the Civil War, and World 
War II. America’s ideals of democracy, liberty, and equality, I suggest, have 
had far more ultimate impact on the law than most recent legal thinkers have 
wanted to acknowledge. For better or worse, my historical scholarship has 
focused on how America’s great wars have transformed the structure of insti-
tutional power and on how those transformations in the structure of power 
have led to change in national ideals and ultimately to legal change. This em-
phasis on war and wartime ideals distinguishes my work from that of neo-
Marxists whose historical writing focuses on the distribution of wealth, of 
Hurstians who focus on the role of government in creating wealth, and of a 
66. Id. at 83-84.
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vast body of recent historical scholarship emphasizing matters of race, gender, 
sexual orientation, and the like.
In the case of America, the three great wars—the Revolutionary War, the 
Civil War, and World War II—confirmed and enhanced the power of popular, 
democratic forces, who instantiated the ideal of equal liberty into the Ameri-
can creed. During and in the aftermath of the three wars, judges and other 
institutional actors transformed this creed of equal liberty into law—law that 
has been broadly accepted by the American people as a whole. Individual 
judges, in my view, are obliged today to follow this law. They have no busi-
ness in pursuit of their private policy agendas or of the agendas of transient 
political majorities altering what the people over time collectively have done.
